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Over the last four decades, the issue of climate change has drawn a rather great amount of 
attention in the international environmental law arena. Starting in 1992 with the adoption of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), climate change 
began to be addressed for the first time as an international concern and at an international 
level. The adoption of the UNFCCC was merely a framework Convention without any actual 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Nevertheless, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC was adopted and it entered into force in 2005. Such Protocol gave enforcement to 
the principles and objectives of the parent framework Convention. 
The Protocol consisted of a first commitment period which began in 2008 and concluded in 
2012. Such period imposed obligations on all Parties but only compulsory emission reduction 
targets on developed countries. The distinction between both worlds was due to the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR).  
After the conclusion of the first commitment period, there was large uncertainty regarding the 
future of the Kyoto Protocol as there was no other legal regime in existence for the post-2012 
period. This gave rise to heated debates at various Conferences of the Parties (COP’s). 
Fortunately, in 2012 at Doha, Qatar an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted which 
ultimately created a second commitment period between member Parties and it extended the 
Protocol from 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2020.  
This thesis will primarily focus on the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period, coupled 
with the legal issues which have had to be addressed in order to ensure a seamless transition 
onto the second commitment period. Thereafter, an analysis will be provided regarding the 
potential efficacy of the second commitment period and whether this will be sufficient to curb 
global climate change.  
The author is of the view that by the culmination of this thesis, the reader would have an up-
to-date understanding of the current status of the international legal climate change regime. 
This will enable the reader to comprehend what the member Parties needed to decide in order 
for a second commitment period to emerge and how it will work.  
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Over the last four decades, climate change has become an issue of paramount importance in 
the arena of international environmental law. According to Kidd, ‘Climate change is perhaps 
the most important environmental concern facing the international community today.’
1
 This 
clearly depicts that environmental catastrophes have escalated in numbers and gravity to such 
an extent that addressing climate change through the adoption and subsequent enforcement of 
future Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA’s) is only part of the solution.   
 
In order to comprehend global climate change, scientific statistics should briefly be addressed 
so as to bring light in understanding what this climate phenomenon actually means. Climate 
change can be defined as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere, and which is in addition 




In addition, some of the environmental changes which have been caused by climate change 
can best be depicted in the following manner: ‘climate change has brought about increases in 
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting ice, and rising global sea level 




If one takes into consideration the above-mentioned consequences, it becomes evident that 
worldwide cooperation is crucial in addressing a problem of such magnitude. ‘As 
international concern over the increasing evidence of global warming and its implications 
                                                          
1
 Kidd, M, ‘International Environmental Law’ in Kidd M. Environmental Law. 2
nd
 ed, (2011), 45 at 60. 
2
 Article 1(2) of the UNFCCC. See Glazewski, J & du Toit, L. ‘International Climate Change Law’ in J 
Glazewski. Environmental Law in South Africa. Service Issue 1, (2013), 3-1 at 3-6. 
3
 Alestalo, M. Man-made Climate Change: The Scientific basis and the Main Implications. International 
Environmental Law-making and Diplomacy Review 2010. UNEP, (2011), at 4. 
have grown, the international community recognised that concerted efforts would be 




According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which will be analysed in chapter 2 below, it has stated that climate change has to be 
addressed by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
5
 ‘In 2010, governments agreed that 
emissions need to be reduced so that global temperature increases are limited to below 2 
degrees Celsius.’
6
  An analysis describing why greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced 
by states will be given coupled with the legal issues which have had to be addressed in order 
to ensure their presence and enforcement.  
Furthermore, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
7
 only by 
significant and immediate reductions in the amount of carbon dioxide emitted can we hope to 
avoid the more catastrophic consequences.
8
 Regarding its consequences, it is predicted that 
‘the global average surface temperature is expected to rise by 0.2 to 0.4 degrees Celsius per 
decade throughout the 21
st
 century and would continue to rise thereafter.’ 
9
 Also, towards the 
end of this century, the total accumulation of warming is expected to be approximately 
between ‘3 to 5 degrees Celsius.’
10
 It must be noted however, that the increase in temperature 
can have the consequences of ‘shifting climate zones, destruction of forests, endanger 
ecosystems such as mountains and wetlands, result in a surge of diseases and affect 




                                                          
4
 Rumsey, A.B. & King, N.D. ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation; Threats and 
Opportunities’ in HA Strydom & ND King, Environmental Management in South Africa, 2
nd
 ed, (2009), 1048 at 
1052. 
5
 Carbon dioxide is one of the principal greenhouse gases being emitted into the atmosphere. See Australian 
Government. Department of the Environment. Greenhouse Effect. Available at: 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/greenhouse-effect. Accessed on: 1 November 2013. 
6
 A rise of 2 degrees Celsius in global air temperature is the maximum increase which should take place in order 
to keep climate change consequences under control. See Background to the UNFCCC: The international 
response to climate change. Available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. 2013. 
Accessed on: 22 November 2013.  
7
 In 1998, the IPCC was formed by the ‘World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).’ The IPCC is not mandated to do its own research. Its assessments are done 
by gathering analyses of peer reviews and published scientific reports on the issue of climate change. See 
Rumsey & King (note 4) at 1050. 
8
 Climate change 2007: ‘The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers’ IPCC Working Group I 
Report. 
9
 United Nations Found & Sigma Xi: The Scientific Research Society, Confronting Climate Change: Avoiding 
the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable 1-2 (2007). Available at: 
http://www.sigmaxi.org/about/news/UNSEGonline.pdf. Accessed on: 6 December 2013.  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Oberthur, S & Ott, H,E. The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21
st
 Century, (1999), at 4-5.  
In its latest published report, namely the Fourth Assessment Report, which was released in 
2007
12
 the IPCC found that there are significant anthropogenic (human-induced) climate 





The Fourth Assessment Report
14
 stated that carbon dioxide constituted 57 % of all 
greenhouse gases concentrated in the atmosphere. In addition, it was also reported that there 
was approximately 90 % certainty that climate change was human-induced. ‘This marks an 
increase from 66 % in 2001 and just over 50 % in 1995.’
15
 
The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, is due to be completed and be made fully available 
during October 2014. Nevertheless, a summary of it has been made available for policy-
makers. Such summary states that there is now ‘95% confidence that humans are the main 
cause of the current global warming. In fact, if one looks closely, the IPCC says that humans 
have most likely caused all of the global warming over the past 60 years.’
16
 
After having laid the scientific foundation of climate change, a shift must be made towards 
how climate change is currently being addressed through the use of legal regimes. 
Initially, in 1992 the international community adopted the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was one of the outcomes of the Earth 
Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. The framework Convention has near universal 
membership
17
 with 195 Parties. This was the very first step in the recognition that climate 
change was a serious threat to life on Earth and that immediate action had to be taken at an 
international level. In other words, cooperation from states and subsequently from member 
Parties to the framework Convention was not only required but also vital.  
                                                          
12
 Mabey, N, Hall, S, Smith, C & Gupta, S. Argument in the Greenhouse: The International Economics of 
Controlling Climate Change, (1997), at 5. 
13
 For possible environmental, social and economic catastrophes that may result from global climate change, see 
IPCC Climate change 2001: Impacts, adaptation, vulnerability to life on earth as we know it (B Metz, OR 
Davidson, PR Bosch, R Dave & LA Mayer (eds) Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2007).  
14
The Guardian. Environment. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-
consensus97percent/2013/sep/27/global-warming-ipcc-report-humans. 2013. Accessed on: 13 November 2013. 
15
 IPCC Report Leaked. Available at: http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/3543/20130820/leaked-ipcc-
reportcites95percent-certainty-global-warming-manmade.htm. 2013. Accessed on: 13 November 2013. 
16
 See The Guardian. Environment (note 14).  
17
 Universal membership  amounts to a total of 197 member Parties. See United Nations Environment 
Programme. Ozone Secretariat. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Available at: 
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/vienna_convention.php. 2011. Accessed on 17 January 2014. 
However, while the framework Convention was the initial MEA to address climate change, it 
did not contain specific emission reduction targets applicable to member Parties. All the 
framework Convention did was impose general obligations on the developed world but no 
mention was made as to how such obligations were to be carried out. Due to this, in 1997 the 
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which is currently comprised of 192 Parties with 83 
signatories, was adopted. This Protocol contained legally binding emission reduction targets 
applicable to the developed world and certain obligations without emission reduction targets 
posed on the developing world. The differentiation between developed and developing 
countries arose from the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR).’
18
 
The importance of this principle is of such nature that it will be addressed in greater detail in 
chapter 2 below. 
Both these international instruments took centre stage at a time when there was scientific 
uncertainty regarding whether climate change was indeed taking place, or whether it was a 
normal weather cycle bound to take place, despite human interference.
19
 Nevertheless, 
despite such uncertainty, 195 Parties gathered in Rio to adopt the UNFCCC as well as its 
Protocol five years later in Kyoto, Japan.  
Furthermore, since global climate change is an on-going process and that it has been 
occurring with greater intensity since 1760, when the Industrial Revolution
20
 began, an 
adaptive legal regime was needed. In other words, an instrument which was strict enough to 
address climate change, yet flexible enough so as to allow it to adapt to possible climate 





                                                          
18
 The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ derives from the notion of the ‘common heritage 
of mankind.’ This notion represents equity in international law. The principle states that not all states have the 
same capacity to effectively address the issue of climate change. In other words, developed states must assists 
developing states in addressing this issue as they are in a better financial position (more resources available). 
The link between the notion and the principle is that while the environment belongs to all, a differentiation must 
be made between those who are more responsible for its degradation and those who are also responsible but to a 
lesser extent. See A CISDL Legal Brief. The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins 
and Scope. Available at:  http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf. 2002. Accessed on: 6 December 
2013.  
19
 See The Guardian. Environment (note 14). 
20
 Montagna, J.A. Yale-New Haven Teacher Institute. The Industrial Revolution. Available at: 
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1981/2/81.02.06.x.html. 2013. Accessed on: 31 October 2013. 
21
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Basis-Summary for 
Policymakers (Fourth Assessment Report). Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch. 2007. Accessed on: 16 August 
2013, at 5.  
As it has been seen, a climate change regime was needed in place and without further delays. 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted but only entered into force in 2005. This was due to 
a lack of political will
22
 to ratify the Protocol.
23
 Nevertheless, the Protocol entered into force 
in 2005 and its first commitment period commenced on 1 January 2008 and concluded on 31 
December 2012. In order to properly address greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Protocol 
had to ensure that reductions be monitored and assessed through commitment periods. In 
other words, developed states would comply with emission reduction targets for five years, as 
was the case in the first commitment period, and if positive results were obtained, developed 
states would continue with the same philosophy in a further commitment period, as is the 
current case with the second commitment period. The logic behind this is that greenhouse gas 
emissions from developed as well as developing countries vary from time to time
24
 therefore 
it would be unwise to have a commitment period which lasts indefinitely. Periods must be 
short (five to eight years) in order to ensure that emission reduction targets can be adjusted in 
subsequent periods should it be needed. However, one of the biggest uncertainties which 
surrounded the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, which on paper only lasted until 2012, was 
the future post-2012. 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 commences with a brief description 
of how climate change issues were firstly addressed in the early 1990’s. Followed by the role 
played by the IPCC in providing scientific certainty regarding climate change. Chapter 2 
provides a brief overview of the climate change regime which is still the only legal 
instrument which addresses and combats climate change at an international level. In addition, 
how the Kyoto Protocol came to light after the UNFCCC adopted it in 1997. The 
interconnectedness between the Kyoto Protocol and its first commitment period which 
concluded in December 2012 will be thoroughly described. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of 
the climate change regime up until 2012, coupled with the shortfalls of the first commitment 
period. Also how all these weaknesses were partly addressed at the eighteenth Conference of 
the Parties (COP 18) in Doha, Qatar during December 2012.  
                                                          
22
 Climate Change. Past and Future. Climate Change in the Political Realm. Kyoto and Den Haag: what is (not) 
happening? Available at: http://earthguide.ucsd.edu/virtualmuseum/climatechange2/09_1.shtml. 2002. Accessed 
on: 6 December 2013.  
23
 It must not be forgotten that international instruments must be signed and thereafter ratified for them to come 
into force. In terms of the Kyoto Protocol, only once it had been ratified by three-fourths of the Parties, only 
then it would come into force. 
24
 Depending on economic expansion. 
Chapter 4 is the primary focus of this thesis. This will solely focus on how the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second commitment period (2013-2020) was adopted, all the legal issues which 
have had to be addressed in order to secure its establishment and how it sets it apart from its 
weaker, older brother- the first commitment period. Importantly, the second commitment 
period will take centre stage with specific focus on how it has been operating since 1 January 
2013 until it concludes on 31 December 2020. Of paramount importance, is the issue of 
ratification by the member Parties and whether provisional application of the amendment has 
in fact succeeded in bringing such amendments into legal operation. 
The concluding phase of the thesis is located in chapter 5. This chapter relates to the future of 
a climate change regime, how an international agreement which is scheduled to be adopted in 
2015 at COP 21 in Paris and be fully operational from 2020 will be addressed and how such 
future agreement could be a better attempt to address climate change. It must not be forgotten 
that should the second commitment period not be addressing climate change as it is mandated 
to operate; this would simply cause chaos since at the moment it is the only operating legal 
regime addressing climate change at an international level. Lastly, concluding remark 














International Legal Regime 
_________________________________________ 
2.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Given the fact that environmental problems are unavoidable, due to our continued over-
reliance and dependence on fossil fuels, and that they extend over and above a country’s 
jurisdiction, has become a worldwide concern. In other words, climate change happens to 
take place at a worldwide scale and it does not have limits or restrictions. ‘The nature of 




Having stated such crucial fact, it would be of paramount importance to begin with a 
description of the international legal instruments, which are currently addressing climate 
change. Firstly, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted 
in 1992 after the Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
26
 It was adopted and 
signed by 195 Parties, obtaining almost universal membership.
27
 In addition, it can also be 
stated that ‘one of the accomplishments of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was the adoption of 




In order to understand the massive role played by the UNFCCC in climate change, 
mentioning its objective is crucial. The objective of the UNFCCC, located in Article 2 of the 
                                                          
25
 See Kidd (note 1) at 45.  
26
 The UNFCCC has near-universal membership. A staggering 195 countries have thus far ratified the 
Convention. As it can be seen, the fact that almost universal membership was attained clearly depicts how 
important the collaboration from the world at large was and still is in the fight against climate change. See 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Essential Background. The Convention. Available 
at:  http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php. Accessed on: 6 December 2013.  
27
 UNEP. International Environmental Law-making and Diplomacy Review 2010. 2011. Editorial Preface. 
28





framework Convention, is to ‘achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.’
29
 However, even though the framework Convention can be regarded as the 
first step in addressing climate change at an international level, its ultimate objective, ‘to 
achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations’
30
 was rather vague and too broad. In 
other words, no specific emission reduction targets were mentioned in the framework 
Convention. ‘The obligations, such that there are, under the UNFCCC were seen as 





A shift must now be made towards the cornerstone principles of the UNFCCC, which are of 
outmost importance: 
1. The fundamental core principle of the UNFCCC, which has resulted in the seemingly 




According to Soltau, ‘Parties should protect the climate system on an equitable basis, but 
allowing for different responsibilities depending on their individual capacities.’
33
 This 
principle is also referred to as ‘fairness or equity’.
34
 This leads to the conclusion that not all 
states have the same capacity to combat global climate change. ‘It thus provides the 




                                                          
29
 The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties 
may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. See United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Full text of the Convention. (note 26).  
30
 Article 2 of the UNFCCC. 
31
 See Kidd (note 1) at 60.  
32
 This acknowledges different responsibilities for developed and developing countries, and allows for 
developed countries to take the lead as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC. See Glazewski & du Toit 
(note 2) at 3-7. 
33
 Soltau, F. Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (2009), at 168. 
34
 Ibid at 168. 
35
 Sands, P. Principles of International Environmental Law, (1995), at 217-220 and Magraw, D. ‘Legal 
Treatment  of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute Norms’ 1990 Columbia Journal of 
International Law and Policy at 69.  
2. The specific needs and circumstances of developing countries are considered36 this 
will ensure that developing countries do not bear a disproportionate burden under the 
framework Convention. It is furthermore recognised in Article 4(7)
37
 that economic 
and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities 
of developing country Parties; and 
 
3. International trade is encouraged to promote economic growth of all parties.38  
The writer is of the view that even though the environment should be the principal priority in 
addressing climate change, it seems that economic considerations have overtaken the main 
objective of the international instruments addressing climate change. This can be attributed to 
the fact that no Party to the framework Convention or to the Protocol would be willing to 
spend large amounts of money if such contributions are likely to affect their economies. In 
other words, lack of political will and international cooperation do have the impact of 
preventing a high degree of success when attempting to enforce international agreements. 
Nevertheless, such a statement requires further clarification which will be provided for 
below.  
The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005 with the ratification of Russia,
39
 
distinguished between different categories of countries in a way that provides for the 
principle of CBDR’s.
40
 In terms of the Protocol, developed countries and countries with 
economies in transition were required to reduce their greenhouse gas emission levels to 
specified percentages, while developing countries did not carry the same burden and were not 
subjected to compulsory emission reduction targets. However, even though developing 
countries did have obligations, such obligations did not impose on them compulsory emission 
                                                          
36
 Article 3(2) of the UNFCCC. 
37
 Article 4(7) of the UNFCCC states as follows: The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed 
country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of 
technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are 
the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. See United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. Full text of the Convention. (note 26).  
38
 Article 3(5) acknowledges the link between the environment and sustainable economic growth, and stipulates 
that measures to combat climate change should not impose restrictions on international trade. 
39
 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005. This was done according with Article 23 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Such Article stated that the Protocol would come into operation only after 90 days had elapsed 
from the ratification of at least 55 Parties. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Status Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 2013. Accessed on: 10 December 2013.  
40
 This principle is reinforced in Article 3 of the UNFCCC. 
 
reduction targets. As it can be seen, the principle of CBDR protected developing countries 
from any form of compulsory obligations or compulsory emission reduction targets, due to 
the fact that the developed world was more
41
 responsible for the amount of greenhouse gases 
historically emitted.  
 
Due to the fact that the UNFCCC was merely a framework Convention, it became evident 
that specific greenhouse gas emission reduction targets had to be put in place through another 
legal instrument. The parties to the framework Convention initiated this at the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Berlin in 1995. The negotiations in 1995 
led to the Berlin Mandate
42
 which ultimately led to the creation of an international legally 
binding instrument to enforce the objectives of the UNFCCC. This resulted in the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997
43
 at COP 3, and which came into force in February 2005. 
As it can be seen, the UNFCCC was the initial driving mechanism which addressed the 
complex issue of climate change. The author has decided to label climate change as 
‘complex’ due to the fact that it is essentially recognised that developed states are primarily 
responsible for a large portion of the greenhouse gases presently polluting the atmosphere, 
making it their responsibility to stop the increase of global emissions. This has and continues 
to place an enormous amount of pressure on developed states to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and to ‘take the lead’ in combating global climate change. This dilemma is a 
continuing process which will in almost all probability last until the principle of CBDR is 
amended or adapted in order to include the cooperation from the developed world. 
Cooperation can be attained by distributing the responsibilities to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions between developed and developing countries.  
2.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
The first emergence of the Kyoto Protocol took place at COP 1 to the UNFCCC, which was 
held in Berlin in 1995. Here, the parties decided that the commitments under the UNFCCC 
were inadequate and vague and that actual emission reduction targets needed to be put in 
                                                          
41
 International Public Policy Forum. This house believes that developed countries have a higher obligation to 
combat climate change than developing countries. Available at: 
http://ippf.idebate.org/debatabase/debates/environment/house-believes-developed-countries-have-higher-
obligation-combat-climate-change-d. Accessed on: 10 December 2013.  
42
 Report on the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995. 
Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf. Accessed on: 7 December 2013.  
43
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 1998. Accessed on: 7 December 2013.  
place to properly address global climate change. Due to this, the Kyoto Protocol was born in 
1997 at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan.  
The Protocol aims to supplement and strengthen the commitments undertaken in the 
UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate. The Protocol addresses three of the primary objectives set 
out in the Mandate: 
1. To create legally binding emission reduction targets for industrialised nations; 
2. A requirement that industrialised countries further develop and extend policies; and  
3. Measures to meet the emission reduction targets.  
The Kyoto Protocol’s principal intention is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by imposing 
emission reduction targets on developed countries (referred to as Annex I countries) while 
developing countries (referred to as non-Annex I countries) are not subject to emission 
reduction targets. 
 
For instance, the Protocol required a commitment of greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets from developed countries, which had to be met between 2008 and 2012. This period 
was referred to as the ‘first commitment period’, which will be described and analysed in 
greater detail below.  
 
However, while developing countries did have obligations under the Protocol, they were not 
subjected to compulsory emission reduction targets. ‘The Kyoto Protocol focuses on 
industrialised countries because they are responsible for most of the past and current 
greenhouse gas emissions and have the technical knowledge and financial resources to reduce 
them.’
44
 From a logical point of view, it seems that the rationale for imposing a greater sense 
of responsibility upon developed countries to reduce their emissions and thereby take the lead 
in combating global climate change seemed to be in line with the principle of CBDR.  
 
According to Article 3 of the Protocol, the emission targets provided for in such article and 
listed in Annex B, were applicable during the first commitment period which ended on 31 
                                                          
44







December 2012. Each country had its own emission target which it had committed itself to in 
terms of the Protocol. Targets ranged from an 8 % reduction in the European Union (EU) and 
a 6 % reduction in Japan, to a condoned
45
 8 % increase in the base year emissions for 
Australia, a 10 % increase for Iceland and a 1% increase for Norway. The aggregate 
reduction from 1990 emission levels was 5.2 %.
46
 As it can be seen, there were three specific 
instances where developed countries were allowed to increase their greenhouse gas emissions 
over their 1990 base levels. While this was allowed under the Protocol, it was due to the 
different circumstances of each state and the means to reduce (or increase) their emissions in 
the first commitment period.  
This basically meant that almost all emission reductions had to be by at least 5.2% below 
1990 levels and this was to be achieved during the 2008-2012 period.  
‘During the Protocol’s first commitment period, each Party was allocated an “assigned 
amount” (AA) based on the reduction target they had committed themselves to in Annex B. 
This was also referred to as allowed emissions. The allowed emissions are divided into 
“assigned amount units (AAU’s).” Article 17 of the Protocol allows member Parties that have 
emission units to spare to sell this surplus.’
47
 In other words, if a member Party emits under 
its allowed emissions, this would create a benefit for such Parties and are therefore entitled to 
profit from such surplus created.  
The assigned amount is calculated in the following manner: 
(1990 base year emissions) x (individual target in Annex B) x 5 (i.e. the number of years in 
the first commitment period). 
For instance, Germany was one of the most successful countries, as being part of the EU, in 
reaching its Kyoto target during the first commitment period. Germany had an emission 
reduction target of 21% below 1990 levels. This AA begins as being equal to the AAU’s 
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issued to each country within the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, in Germany’s case, they 
possessed AAU’s equal to their AA. For instance, the moment that a country exceeds its AA 
(allowed emissions) then a gap would be created between its AA and its AAU’s. Such gap 
would constitute a shortage of AAU’s. Conversely, if a country emits below its AA, a gap 
would also be created between its AA and its AAU’s. However, such gap would create a 
surplus of AAU’s. Hypothetically speaking, if Germany had emissions exceeding its target, 
then there would have been a shortfall of AAU’s due to the gap created as explained above. 
On the other hand, if Germany had emissions below its target, this would have created a 
surplus of AAU’s, which would have been viable for trading.  
In other words, an AAU is created the moment emissions are below a Party’s target. 
Conversely, AAU’s decrease in numbers the moment emissions exceed a Party’s target.  
In addition, ‘annex I countries that have signed the Protocol are expected to meet their 
binding greenhouse gas emissions targets via national measures.’
48
 These measures include: 
‘enhancing energy efficiency, protecting greenhouse gas sinks
49
 and reservoirs, promoting 
sustainable forms of agriculture, researching new forms of renewable energy, phasing out 
incentives and tax deductions for all greenhouse gas emitting sectors, encouraging reform in 




Furthermore, in order for developed countries to comply with their emission reduction 
targets, certain mechanisms were put in place so as to assist such countries with compliance. 
In addition, the reason for such aid was due to the fact that reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is a rather expensive exercise and these mechanisms provided the opportunity to 
reach their targets in different manners. Nevertheless, these mechanisms were only 
supplementary to their greenhouse gas emission reductions. In other words, developed 
countries could not take advantage of these mechanisms and comply with reductions only be 
relying on these mechanisms.  
These mechanisms, also termed the ‘Kyoto Mechanisms’ or ‘Flexibility Mechanisms’, 
allowed Annex I countries to reduce their emissions by financing the reduction of emission in 
other countries. The Protocol provides for three flexible mechanisms: Joint Implementation 
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(JI), Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM’s) and Emissions Trading (ET). These 
mechanisms will be firstly described and thereafter analysed below: 
1. Joint Implementation can be located in Article 651 of the Protocol: 
This allows Annex I nations to invest in specific emission reduction projects in other Annex I 
nations. These projects can either reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or increase the 
removal of greenhouse gases through sinks.
52
 The investing nation can then set-off their own 
emission levels with the emission reductions gained in the host nation. Emission reductions 
are measured in emission reduction units (ERU’s). 
There are, however, preconditions to the use of the JI mechanism: 
 Both states must be Party to the Protocol and there must be express approval of the 
project both by the transferor and transferee state
53
; 




 The state attempting to acquire ERU’s must itself be in compliance with a certain 
number of Protocol obligations (Articles 5 and 7)
55
 and; 
 The use of the JI mechanism cannot be a substitute for domestic action in the 
investing state, it can only be supplementary
56
.  
As it can be seen from this particular mechanism, the main purpose of JI was to allow Annex 
I and Annex II member Parties to ultimately reduce the carbon dioxide concentration in the 
atmosphere, without actually reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, 
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Annex I countries were able to reach their targets by reducing greenhouse gas emission in 
other Annex I countries.  
 
2. Clean Development Mechanisms can be located in Article 1257 of the Protocol: 
This allows Annex I states to generate reductions of their own emission levels through 
projects undertaken in non-Annex I states. The Clean Development Mechanism operates in a 
similar way to the JI, only it allows Annex I states to benefit from investing in emission 
reduction projects in developing countries, rather than fellow Annex I countries. The 
reduction of emissions is measured in Certified Emission Reductions (CER’s). 
Since addressing climate change has become a rather expensive exercise, Annex I Parties 
have come to the realization that ‘it is cheaper to achieve emissions reductions in developing 
countries.’
58
 For instance, ‘the average cost of achieving emission reductions in developing 
countries is less than US$ 3 per ton of carbon dioxide, while the average cost of attaining 
similar reductions in developed countries is estimated to be around US$ 15 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide.’
59
 Therefore, if one carefully dissects such ideology, it would become evident 
that the focus is taken off of emission reductions taking place in developed countries 
themselves, and it is shifted towards what they can do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
developing countries. 
Nevertheless, it seems that once again the economic considerations of the Protocol regarding 
the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions have resurfaced. In other words, the author is 
of the view that Parties have their priorities mistaken. If the Protocol is to ever be a success, 
then the principal issue should be the environment and secondly it’s financial aspect. The 
rationale here is that if parties negotiate an international legal instrument by firstly taking into 
account how much it will cost their economies, then the main environmental purpose has 
already been abandoned.  
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3. Emissions Trading can be located in Article 1760 of the Protocol: 
As stated above, Article 17 provides that if a Party has a surplus of AAU’s, that Party may 
sell the surplus to another Party who has used up or is close to using up all their AAU’s. 
Bearing in mind that if a Party meets its emission reduction target and continues to decrease 
emissions, then such Party would have extra or a ‘surplus’ of AAU’s. On the other hand, if a 
Party exceeds its allowed emissions, in other words it increases its greenhouse gas emissions; 
this would result in a shortage of AAU’s. Due to this shortage of AAU’s, such Party can 
partly comply and meet its emission reduction target by either reducing its emissions or by 
purchasing AAU’s from other Parties which have a surplus. 
The Conference of the Parties in 2005 adopted certain modalities, rules and guidelines in 
respect of emissions trading. As a result, it is not only AAU’s that may be traded, but also 
other ‘Kyoto units’. The units that may be traded include: 
 A ‘removal unit’ (RMU) on the basis of land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities such as reforestation; 
 An ‘emission reduction unit’ (ERU), generated by a JI project and; 
 A ‘certified emission reduction unit’ (CER) generated from a CDM project activity.  
However, as stated above, the use of these trading mechanisms must be additional to the 
Party’s domestic emission reducing activities. Therefore, a party cannot fully rely on 
emissions trading in order to meet its Kyoto emissions target. The reason for this is to avoid 
abuse of the flexible mechanisms. Abuse can take the form of over-reliance on the use of the 
mechanisms and not actually reducing their greenhouse gases. In other words, Parties should 
avoid being too involved in trading in the ‘carbon market’ since the benefits from selling and 
purchasing carbon units do not mean full compliance with their emission reduction targets.  
Fortunately, in order to prevent a party from overselling its Kyoto units, it is required that 
each Party maintains what is known as a ‘commitment period reserve.’
61
 In terms of this, a 
trading Party is required to keep at minimum of 90% of its units in reserve.  
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2.2.1 First Commitment Period 
One of the most controversial aspects about the Kyoto Protocol and its first commitment 
period has been the actual role played by developed countries without greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets such as the United States of America. Also, the role played by 
major greenhouse gas emitters from the developing world 
62
 namely China and India.  
The Kyoto Protocol and its founding framework Convention
63
differentiated between member 
Parties by using the principle of CBDR’s. Such division between the developed and 
developing world gave rise to disagreements and a visible tension which developed countries 
have had to endure during the negotiations which led to the adoption of the current climate 
change regime.  
As stated previously, the principle of CBDR’s derives from the premise that developed 
countries have contributed more to climate change and also possess greater resources to 
address the problem.
64
 In addition, developing countries have not been emitting greenhouse 
gases for as long as developed countries have, reason why their economies are not as 
developed as the ones from developed states.
65
 
Regarding the role played (or lack thereof) from the United States, it became trite that it had 
no intention of being bound by the Kyoto Protocol for as long as no emission reduction 
targets were imposed on developing countries. ‘The United States signed the Protocol, 
however, the Clinton Administration did not submit the Protocol to the Senate for advice and 
consent’
66
 resulting in a lack of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol from the United States. 
The United States has throughout the years of negotiations taken an inflexible position 
regarding positive participation within the Kyoto Protocol. The United States has stated that 
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‘meaningful participation’
67
 from developing countries was required before they commit 
themselves to greenhouse gas emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Interestingly, even though the United States has not ratified the Protocol nor is bound by 
international emission reduction targets, it has managed to reduce its emissions by 
implementing domestic measures. ‘The U.S. has reduced its CO2 emissions 12.1% below its 
2007 peak high and has, by far, reduced CO2 more than any other large industrialized nation 
and in 2012, the United States became the first major industrialized nation in the world to 
meet the United Nation’s original Kyoto Protocol 2012 target for CO2 reductions.’
68
 This 
clearly shows that the United States has the resources to implement domestic measures in 
order to reduce their emissions to acceptable levels. The dilemma is however, gathering 
efforts to ensure that the United States ratifies the Protocol to ensure that it continues to 
reduce its emissions through an international climate change regime.  
 
On the other hand, ‘to date, none of the largest developing countries, such as China, India or 
Brazil, have shown a willingness to make commitments to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions’
69
 in terms of a legally binding international instrument.  
The focus must now be placed on the developed countries which were bound by greenhouse 
gas emission reduction targets. The author is of the view that in order to properly analyse the 
Kyoto Protocol’s efficacy, one must firstly look at whether countries which were bound by 
emission reduction targets actually met those targets. 
One of the successes within the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period has been the 
performance displayed by Germany in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions and thereby 
meeting its target. ‘Germany met the emission targets for the 2008 to 2012 period under the 




The majority of developed EU member countries have reached their emission reduction 
targets thereby positively contributing to the fight in curbing global greenhouse gas 
emissions. ‘According to European Environment Agency’s estimates, the largest relative 
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emissions decreases from 2010 to 2011 were registered in countries with small to medium 





On the other hand, a few countries with economies in transition did not perform as positively 
as other developed countries.
72
 For instance, ‘nine EU member states increased emissions 
between 2010 and 2011: Bulgaria increased emissions by 11 %, while Lithuania increased by 




Regarding developing countries which are member Parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, but which certainly do not have compulsory emission reduction targets, India is 
currently the third largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world and it accounts for 6% of all 
global emissions. This makes India a crucial player in the global greenhouse gas emissions 
arena. ‘Despite the fact that India, like China, refuses to engage in emissions cuts through 
international binding agreements, the country is said to adopt an innovative market-based 
scheme (PAT) as part of the National Action Plan for Climate Change, to promote energy 




As it can be deduced from the above-mentioned description of the Kyoto Protocol and its first 
commitment period, there are loopholes in such climate change regime which require further 
clarification. A great degree of frustration has been evident from the developed as well as the 
developing world regarding the efficiency of the Protocol. Up until 2011, there was not a 
clear vision regarding what type of legal instrument or answer would best address climate 
change.  
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However, in 2011, at COP 17
75
 which was held in Durban, South Africa, yet a second 
commitment period was agreed. Nevertheless, it took yet another year at COP 18
76
 in Doha, 
Qatar, in 2012, where the only solution to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive was to effect an 
amendment and extend its reign with yet another commitment period. Such second 
commitment period was adopted as it commenced on 1 January 2013 and will conclude on 31 
December 2020.  
Even though this might seem as a possible answer to address climate change, the reality is 
rather different. There has been an international impasse in recent years, primarily because 
the major player not a party to the Kyoto Protocol and, until recently, the biggest contributor 
to climate change, the United States of America, is reluctant to enter into any agreement 
containing binding emissions reduction targets unless other major emitters in the developing 
world, such as China and India, are also subject to binding targets. Developing countries, on 
the other hand, are invoking the principle of CBDR’s in arguing that the major contributors to 
climate change in the past were the developed countries and, moreover, were they to be 
bound to mandatory emissions reduction targets, their economic growth would be stifled.
77
  
Lastly, in order to obtain an educated understanding of the accomplishments of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period, an analysis of its weaknesses and shortfalls is crucial. 
This is due to the fact that it must always be acknowledged that any international legal 
instrument is as strong as its weaknesses are. An analysis of the shortcomings of the first 
commitment period which symbolises the obstacles left for the second commitment period to 
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Analysis of the legal regime up to 2012 
_________________________________________ 
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period which ended on 31 December 2012, can be 
regarded as an international instrument and an era which did indeed attempt to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The author has elected to make use of the word ‘attempt’ due to 
the fact that even though it was the first climate change regime with emission reduction 
targets, the results which were obtained from it were rather weak and insignificant.  
In the eyes of many, the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period has been described as a 
mixture of positive and negative accomplishments. This is due to the fact that while it became 
apparent that its intention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was a strength within the 
Protocol, its actual imposed emission reduction targets and market-based mechanisms were 
not making a significant contribution in curbing global climate change. This meant that ‘this’ 
Protocol would not answer global climate change.
78
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Global climate change is an environmental problem which must be addressed at both national 
as well as at an international level. This means that states which are Parties to the Protocol 
and have emission reduction targets, must implement domestic measures within their states 
so as to give effect to the legally binding provisions of the international instrument. In 
addition, at an international level, cooperation from member Parties to the UNFCCC and the 
Protocol must be of such a nature that visible benefits take place. In other words, if one takes 
into account that the Kyoto Protocol only addresses climate change through the cooperation 
of the developed world, and thereby not requiring the considerable input from the developing 
world, of which the largest emitter of greenhouse gases is part, success is unlikely.  
For instance, ‘China and India are becoming important players in the global GHG arena, the 




In addition, China is the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world contributing to 
approximately 23% of all global emissions, while India contributes to 6% of all global 
emissions. In other words, by combining two developing countries which are not subjected to 
legally binding emission reduction targets, the Kyoto Protocol is already neglecting 
approximately 29% of all global emissions. This statistic is staggering taking into account 
that at the moment only 15% of all global emissions are being addressed through the Kyoto 
Protocol. The author is of the view that the principle of CBDR’s is clearly a shield for 
developing countries which is embraced by both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
without realizing that only two developing countries are currently emitting almost twice as 
much greenhouse gases as what 37 industrialized countries can manage to reduce.  
Even though the UNFCCC refers to the principle of CBDR’s, it must be acknowledged that if 
success is to be obtained in the arena of climate change, worldwide cooperation is crucial. 
Bearing in mind that 15% of all global emissions are being reduced in terms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, means that the remaining 85% can be attributed to the United States of America, 
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This clearly depicts that while a differentiation must be made between developed and 
developing countries, their legally binding cooperation is crucial in addressing climate 
change. The hope for the on-going second commitment period is that all of the shortfalls of 
the first commitment period would have been addressed so as to allow a positive transition 
from the first period onto the second period.    
Furthermore, one of the main criticisms is located in the area of the ‘Kyoto Mechanisms’, 
particularly emissions trading. It has been established that these mechanisms promote a 
‘business as usual’ approach. In other words, it became apparent that while emissions trading 
was intended to assist member Parties in reaching their emission reduction targets, it actually 
became a business of making as much profit as possible out of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-
based mechanism. It can be stated that the main objective of such mechanism failed in the 
pursuit of profit from developed countries and countries with economies in transition. 
It has become evident that Annex I countries are able to obtain cheap achievement of their 
targets through emissions trading rather than investing in long term projects aimed at 
developing renewable sources of energy. Due to this, emissions trading has played a rather 
‘villain’ role when the resources spent in purchasing carbon credits could have been utilized 
in implementing renewable sources of energy. This shows the lack of commitment from the 
developed world. One of the reasons attributed to this can be speculated to be the fact that 
even though the developed world is taking emission reduction commitments under the first 
and now the second commitment period
81
 they know that global climate change is literally 
unstoppable and since their reductions only amount to approximately 15% of all global 
emissions, they might as well make profits from such climate change regime. It seems as if 
no matter what catastrophic consequences society might continue to face, economic stability 
and economic considerations seem to be the main items on the developed world’s agenda.   
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In addition, the author is of the view that emissions trading between developed countries and 
countries with economies in transition is only limited by the fact that a ‘commitment period 
reserve’ of 90% of units must be present at all times. This means that the only form of 
protection against abuse is the ‘commitment period reserve’ which makes the trading of units 
dangerous and the Protocol vulnerable.  
However, one of the possible suggestions so as to make emission trading more efficient 
would be to use the proceeds of such transactions to invest in long term solutions to address 
climate change. For instance, to develop programmes to begin using renewable sources of 
energy in order to reduce the over-reliance of fossil fuel burning to create energy. A clear 
example of this would be China and South Africa. Even though both these developing 
countries are not bound by emission reduction targets, and are not part of the ‘carbon 
market’, if in the future they were to be bound by greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, 
they would be rather important buyers of carbon units which they would utilize to partly 
comply with their emission reduction targets. 
Furthermore, the Protocol makes provision for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF) measures, and the reduction units they occasion, has been subject to much 
criticism. Firstly, ‘it is by no means an easy or accurate task to project what carbon emissions 
the land would have produced had the carbon sink not been created, which is necessary to 
determine how many RMU’s of CER’s are allocated to a project.’
82
 This is critical due to the 
fact that even though mechanisms are put in place to reduce carbon dioxide emissions as 
much as possible, lack of clarity is evident without which, such provisions under the 
LULUCF become rather difficult to interpret and implement.  
The rationale here is that it has become trite that ‘carbon dioxide emissions take place 
whenever there is a disturbance in land, such as land-use changes. However, to measure how 
much carbon dioxide would be naturally emitted by the soil is a difficult measurement to 
take.’
83
 Nevertheless, the importance here is that carbon sink projects must continue to be 
implemented in order to sequester as much carbon dioxide as possible form the atmosphere. 
Even though, such sinks are a temporary solution, they buy developed nations time until more 
long term solutions can be implemented, such as the implementation of clean and renewable 
sources of energy.  
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Unfortunately, only reforestation and afforestation methods can be used within a CDM 
programme. ‘This is problematic in that deforestation is the second largest source of 
greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries.’
84
 As such, the prevention of deforestation 
should earn CER’s within a CDM programme. Also, another problem evident in both 
afforestation and deforestation is that the soil is also a carbon sink, meaning that every time 
the soil is worked, carbon dioxide is emitted into the atmosphere. This is an unfortunate 
event, but if carbon dioxide is to be emitted in any event, it should take place during 
afforestation rather than during deforestation.  
Other criticisms relating to the use of ‘carbon sinks include the fact that they only offer a 
temporary solution, as the carbon trapped in trees is eventually released back into the 
atmosphere (if the tree is burnt or dies).’
85
 In contrast, carbon emissions are avoided for 
longer periods of time through the use of a more efficient process (such as solar power). 
In other words, the Kyoto Protocol does provide for manners in which emission reduction 
targets may be achieved, however, such alternatives are not specified as clearly as they 
should have been which render the overall market-based mechanisms rather weak and heavily 
criticised.  
Furthermore, a highly important fact within the Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction system is 
its actual emission reduction targets. Scientific evidence indicates that by reducing 
greenhouse gases by 5, 2% below 1990 levels will not have a significant impact in curbing 
climate change.
86
 Even though this was an important initial step in the war against climate 
change, surely much more is needed in order to achieve a higher degree of success in the 
future. Higher levels of ambition are required in order to obtain more success within the 
Protocol.  
In addition, the fact that developing countries are not bound by the Protocol, can be stated to 
be one of the most important factors as to why the Protocol has not succeeded in its first 
commitment period as much as it was hoped for. China is regarded as a developing country in 
terms of the Protocol, but it is the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, with the United 
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States of America in second place (19%) and India in third. In other words, two out of the top 
three biggest greenhouse gas emitters on the world, are developing countries. Therefore, 
gains made by developed countries under the Protocol could be partially offset by China’s 
and India’s increasing emissions.  
Of outmost importance in analysing the first commitment period’s lack of success, is the role 
‘played’ by the United States. The author had opted to make use of the word ‘played’ due to 
the fact that the United States never played any role in the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period. In fact, they failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which seriously compromised the 
effectiveness of the legal regime altogether. Bearing in mind that the US is the second largest 
greenhouse gas emitter in the world, without the cooperation of such a large emitter, 
increasing reduction targets in the future may not be feasible.   
In addition, the United States is also one of the strongest economies in the world, meaning 
that they have the resources to effectively implement emission reduction mechanisms under 
the Protocol. The overall success of the Ozone regime created by the Vienna Convention and 
implemented by its Montreal Protocol was largely due to the input and support of the United 
States, indicating the necessity of obtaining their cooperation.
87
  
Even though the success obtained from the Montreal Protocol was attributed to the fact that 
the world did not need certain Ozone Depleting Substance (ODS’s), and by their discontinued 
use, it rendered the Protocol one of the most successful MEA’s of all time, the principle 
which must be captured in the climate change arena is that alternatives must be implemented 
so as to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Higher emission reduction targets must be 
imposed, cooperation from China, the United States and India is crucial, afforestation is also 
important, investing the profits made from emissions trading on long term climate change 
solutions. Renewable sources of energy are key; the continued over-reliance on the burning 
of fossil fuels is what must be discontinued as soon as possible. All these observations are 
what the international community must aim to achieve, and such success will only arrive 
once the environment becomes the principal priority.  
Lastly, the extent to which Parties met their Kyoto targets under the first commitment period 
is an aspect of paramount importance which is worth discussing. Bearing in mind that 37 
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industrialised countries took on commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and that 28
88
 out of 
those 37 countries are part of the EU, means that the EU plays a crucial role in greenhouse 
gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Regarding the extent to which targets were achieved, the EU would be ideal as an example 
since it constitutes the majority of Parties with commitments under the Protocol.  
‘While the EU’s GDP grew by 45% between 1990 and 2011, total emissions from the 28 
member states, including emissions from international aviation, were 16.9% below 1990 
levels in 2011 and an estimated 18% below 1990 in 2012. The Commission’s annual progress 
report on EU greenhouse gas emissions shows that the 15 EU member states at the time the 
Kyoto Protocol was ratified have over-achieved their joint reduction commitment for the first 




As it can been seen from the above facts, the extent to which Parties met their targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period can be said to have been a success within the 
EU. Nevertheless, even though over-achievement was evident within the EU, the same 
attitude and example must be followed by the rest of member Parties to the Protocol taking 
on emission reduction targets under the second commitment period. 
 
In any event, the positive performance displayed by the EU member states, can still be 
regarded as fragile as such over-achievements can be offset by the lack of participation and 
continued over-reliance on fossil fuel burning by the developed world. The second 
commitment period will have a rather difficult task in overcoming the problems faced during 
the first commitment period. An in-depth analysis of the legal issues which member Parties 
had to agree in order to create the second commitment period will be explained in the 
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As stipulated above, one of the most heavily debated issues surrounding climate change has 
been the uncertain future of the Kyoto Protocol. As it has been analysed above, the first 
commitment period came to an end on 31 December 2012, and rather convoluted negotiations 
developed regarding the post-2012 period.   
Initially, it was only in 2007 at COP 13 held in Bali, Indonesia, that Parties to the framework 
Convention realized that the first commitment period would conclude in December 2012 
without a replacement to take over post-2012.
90
 However, it was only in 2011, at COP 17 
held in Durban, South Africa, that a second commitment period which was to address climate 
change was agreed.
91
 In any event, there was much debate around how a second commitment 
period would be adopted and put into operation when the Kyoto Protocol only provided for 
the first commitment period. Therefore, an extension of the Protocol seemed as the more 
realistic option within the time frame that member Parties possessed.  
Fortunately, all the uncertainties regarding how a second commitment period would be 
accommodated were put to rest when in 2012, at COP 18 held in Doha, Qatar, an amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol was finally adopted and it extended the existence of the Protocol from 
1 January 2013 until 31 December 2020. 
92
  
The transition from one commitment period onto the other might have seemed a simple and 
expeditious affair. However, as it was explained above, the process of adopting any 
international instrument is a highly difficult process, which firstly requires the signature of 
the member Parties for it to be adopted and thereafter the ratification of such Parties for it to 
come into force. In addition and most importantly, a number of legal issues have had to be 
dealt with in order to establish the second commitment period. Such legal issues will be 
analysed below.   
Regarding the amendment to the Protocol which was finally adopted at the Doha Climate 
Change Conference in 2012, this took place in a rather pressurized and tense environment. 
This is due to the fact that at the time the conference was being held, there was an immense 
amount of pressure on the Parties to adopt the amendment because a climate change regime 
was needed to be in place and be operational from 1 January 2013. In other words, it seemed 
clear that Parties could not afford to fail as they did in Copenhagen in 2009 at COP 15 when 
the COP only ‘took note of’ the rather political agreement.
93
 If one assesses the failures of the 
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past, it would seem clear that failure was not an option if the Kyoto Protocol was to stay in 
existence. 
In addition, during the closing negotiations at Doha, it became apparent that the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and Belarus were not pleased with the text which was to be adopted to 
give the second commitment period life. Due to this, the Russian Federation decided to raise 
its flag in objection to a second commitment period, yet the President of the conference 
ignored its objection and only ‘noted’ that the Russian Federation had indeed an objection.
94
 
This was a clear sign that the conference could not fail and that consensus
95
 between all the 
member Parties was crucial.
96
 This leads the author to believe that as of December 2012, the 
only available climate change regime which the world at large depended on was an extension 
of the already weak Kyoto Protocol which coming into 2013 did not create much positive 
expectation.  
Nevertheless, at the end
97
 of the conference, the amendment was adopted and the second 
commitment period was born.
98
 However, one of the main issues regarding the Protocol’s 
continued existence now rested on how it would legally operate from 1 January 2013.  
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 Doha managed to keep the Kyoto Protocol in existence through a second commitment period in order to avoid 
having a gap until a new legal regime is finally adopted and put into force in 2020. In other words, the 
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The main objective to be achieved in this chapter is to give the reader a complete and 
thorough view of the changes which have taken place between the first and the second 
commitment periods. These changes will be addressed so as to clearly depict the strengths 
and weaknesses of the current commitment period. In other words, by the end of this crucial 
chapter, one would have a clear understanding of the legal issues which have had to be dealt 
with in the establishment of the second commitment period. This analysis will provide a link 
to further understand the positives and negatives which such second commitment period is 
and will continue to reflect.   
Firstly, a number of amendments have taken place between the first and the second 
commitment periods, but for the purposes of this thesis, the most crucial changes in the 
Kyoto Protocol which have been carried over to the second commitment period will be firstly 
described and secondly analysed. The main purpose of this will be to show how different and 
how much more efficient the Parties to the Protocol have ‘tried’
99
 to make the second 
commitment period.  
One of the most evident differences between the first commitment period which heavily 
reflects in the second commitment period is the change in membership which has taken place. 
The following is an explanation of how the Protocol’s membership has been significantly 
weakened, thereby exposing it to further struggles in the quest to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in accordance with each Party’s emission reduction target. Regarding Annex B of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the following Annex I countries under the Protocol’s first commitment 
period are no longer part of the current period:  
1. ‘On 15 December 2011, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol.’100  
2. ‘On 10 December 2010, Japan indicated that it did not have any intention of 
continuing under the second commitment period.’
101
  
3. ‘New Zealand has also decided to not be part of the second commitment period.’102 
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4. ‘On 8 December 2010 the Russian Federation, communicated that is did not intend to 
continue under the second commitment period.’
103
 
The author is of the view that in order to assess damage control regarding the departure of 
such parties from the Protocol, it would be of paramount importance to analyse how crucial 
their participation (in terms of greenhouse gas emissions) was in the first commitment period. 
For instance, Canada and Japan had under the first commitment period, emission reduction 
targets of 6% respectively below 1990 levels, whereas New Zealand and the Russian 
Federation had 0% emission reductions below 1990 levels. The most evident problem which 
comes to mind is that the Kyoto Protocol was already weak in terms of its membership. In 
other words, without the participation from the United States, and the exclusion of 
developing countries, such as China and India, meant that further reduction in participation 
from states was not ideal. Consequently, the last possible thing the second commitment 
period needed was a shortage of membership, especially from the above-mentioned four 
countries which contributed in total to approximately 12%
104
 of all global greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Regarding Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, the following amendments have taken place for 
the second commitment period: 
The list of greenhouse gases has been supplemented with the following gas: Nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3).  
 
‘NF3 has a 100-year global warming potential of 17,200, meaning that it is 17,200 times 
more powerful than carbon dioxide in trapping atmospheric heat over a 100-year time span, 
much higher than most other greenhouse gases.’
105
  
The following amendments have taken place under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol: 
 Article 3, after paragraph 1: ‘The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or 
jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions of the greenhouse gases listen in Annex A do not exceed their assigned 
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments inscribed in the third column of the table contained in Annex B and in 
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accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall 




This particular amendment can be regarded as the strongest asset which the Kyoto Protocol’s 
second commitment period possesses. The amendment strives to hopefully obtain an average 
increase in greenhouse gas emission reductions from 5.2% to 18%. This is a massive increase 
in emission reductions. However, before the author proceeds to congratulate the member 
Parties to the Protocol for agreeing on such high emission reduction target, one must assess 
the damage which has been caused by no longer having emission reduction contributions 
from Japan, the Russian Federation, Canada and New Zealand. In other words, while on 
paper this might seem as an ambitious target which is hoped to be achieved, it has to be 
admitted that perhaps such a high emission reduction target was proposed in order to 
compensate for the lack of contribution from the above-mentioned states which are no longer 
taking on emission reduction targets.  
At the time of writing, the author firmly believes that an increase in emission reduction 
targets will not succeed over a decrease in the number of member Parties. In other words, the 
second commitment period is imposing higher targets on the member Parties, thereby running 
the possible risk that such Parties might withdraw from the Protocol altogether claiming that 
‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ should also be applied to the developed countries which are left behind 
to ‘take on’ the surplus emissions which they are not directly responsible for.  
 Article 3, after paragraph 1 bis: ‘A Party included in Annex B may propose an 
adjustment to decrease the percentage inscribed in the third column of Annex B of its 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment inscribed in the third 
column of the table contained in Annex B. A proposal for such an adjustment shall be 
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least three months before the 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
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 Article 3, after paragraph 1 ter: ‘An adjustment proposed by a Party included in 
Annex I to increase the ambition of its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitment in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1 ter above, shall be considered 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol unless more than three-fourths of the Parties present and voting object to its 
adoption. The adopted adjustment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the 
Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties, and shall enter into force on 1 January 




The author has opted to discuss both these amendments together due to the fact that they are 
largely connected with each other. Given the fact that Article 3, paragraph 1 ter gives 
member Parties the opportunity to ‘increase’ the percentage inscribed in its quantified 
emission limitation, and at the same time, Article 3, paragraph 1 bis allows countries to 
‘decrease’ the level of ambition requires further analysis. In other words, while it might seem 
apparent that the amendment does cater for flexibility regarding such high emission reduction 
targets (if compared to the targets imposed under the first commitment period), the bottom 
line is that the Kyoto Protocol cannot afford to have a member Party propose an adjustment 
to ‘decrease’ its emission reduction target. One of the biggest obstacles which the current 
climate change regime is facing is that global greenhouse gas emissions are not decreasing, 
they are in fact increasing. Therefore, it is essential that emission reduction targets and 
ambition levels within the Protocol are increased.  
This leads the author to consider that while the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period 
does indeed allow for flexibility within its architecture
109
, certain aspect of it must remain 
rigid if greenhouse gas emissions are to decrease.  
Therefore, strict enough emission reduction targets must be imposed on the current member 
Parties without pushing them to withdraw from the Protocol. In other words, the ideology 
behind this analysis is that a balance must be struck between stringency and flexibility. The 
text of the second commitment period must be strict enough so as to make significant 
contributions in curbing global emissions, yet flexible enough so as to keep member Parties 
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content. This balance has not been achieved due to the fact that taking into consideration that 
four key members are not taking part in emission reductions any longer, the last option 
should be allowing the remaining Parties to ‘propose reducing the ambition levels.’ If the 
Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period is set to improve on the rather weak 
performance displayed by its older brother, the first commitment period, much more is 
needed to make a significant contribution in curbing global climate change.  
As stated above, one of most challenging problems which the Kyoto Protocol faced in its first 
commitment period was the trading of AAU’s. It must not be forgotten that the principle 
behind carbon units trading was to allow member Parties to reach their imposed targets in a 
more financially viable manner. What the Kyoto Protocol did not foresee was the possible, 
without mentioning the likelihood that such trading might lead to an abuse of the system. In 
other words, as explained above, AAU’s could be traded between a member Party which had 
successfully reached their emission reduction target and due to this, had spare (or a surplus) 
of AAU’s to sell to member Parties which were struggling to meet their targets.  
While this can be described as a flexible mechanism within the Protocol, it nevertheless 
created an internal business which was prone to possible abuse. This could be achieved by 
having a surplus of AAU’s, which surplus was obviously anticipated when the Protocol was 
drafted, reason why they provided for the trading of such carbon units. However, what they 
did not anticipate was the fact that should member Parties possess such a large surplus of 
AAU’s, this would result in an over-reliance of selling AAU’s in the pursuit of profit-making. 
While this is indeed an incentive for Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emission below their 
targets, it nevertheless brought the Parties’ intention into question. In other words, the 
primary factor within the Protocol should have been to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
order to combat climate change, and not to seek profits from such reductions. The mentality 
of the Parties is key in ensuring a successful transition onto the second commitment period. It 
is indeed correct to state that economic factors will always play an important role in ensuring 
a continuing combat against climate change, but it should not be the decisive factor.  
As of 2012, the AAU surplus from the first commitment period was estimated to be over 13 
billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Russia (5.8), Ukraine (2.6) and Poland (0.8) are the 
largest surplus holders, followed by Romania (0.7), the UK (0.5) and Germany (0.5).
110
 The 
major reason why such member Parties were able to obtain such a large surplus of AAU’s, 
was due to the fact that they had rather low emission reduction targets under the Protocol, and 
such targets were able to be achieved without great difficulty. In other words, such member 
Parties would carryover such surplus of AAU’s onto the second commitment period and 
reach their emission reduction targets merely by using the surplus and not by actually 
reducing their greenhouse emissions. However, the only obstacle placed in their way was the 
fact that such trading could only be used as a supplementary aid in reaching their targets.  
Due to this abuse of power, an urgent amendment regarding acquisition and trading of 
AAU’s was crucial. Fortunately, when the Protocol was amended
111
 in 2012 so as to give 
way to the second commitment period, it was stated that any surplus of AAU’s could be 
carried over without limit from the first to the second commitment period by Parties included 
in Annex I that have a target for the second commitment period but with restrictions on the 
use of these carried-over AAU’s for the second commitment period and quantitative limits on 
how many of these units may be acquired from other Parties. 
This particular amendment is of extreme importance regarding the second commitment 
period. This is due to the fact that surplus AAU’s was one of the biggest shortfalls concerning 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, which needed to be addressed so as to enable 
the second, and current, commitment period to work more efficiently without the possibility 
of being deceived by its own member Parties.  
As it can be seen, the amendment does incorporate a level of protection against overselling of 
AAU’s. Fortunately, restrictions have been put in place to prevent such overselling and also 
further restrictions on how many units may be sold to other member Parties. The rationale for 
such protection has been addressed in the second commitment period so as to prevent any 
form of abuse from member Parties which possess large surpluses of AAU’s. This is a clear 
example of how the amendment to the Protocol aims to combat possible abuse within the 
legal regime.  
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 Article 3, after paragraph 12 bis: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure that, where units from approved 
activities under market-based mechanisms referred to in paragraph 12 bis above are 
used by Parties included in Annex I to assist them in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, a share of 
these units is used to cover administrative expenses, as well as to assist developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change to 
meet the costs of adaptation if these units are acquired under Article 17.’  
The author has opted to include this particular amendment due to the fact that a change of 
mentality is evident here. For example, by mandating Annex I Parties to use parts of the 
profits made to cover the administrative expenses of such transactions to assist even further 
developing countries in meeting those expenses. The importance of this is that more 
responsibilities are being placed on developed countries within the climate change regime. As 
per the principle envisaged in the UNFCCC of CBDR’s, developed countries are to ‘take the 
lead’ in combating global climate change. This extra burden on them, clearly depicts that 
developed countries are more responsible for curbing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide 
than developing countries. 
4.2 Legal Issues 
Regarding the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period, a number of legal issues have 
had to be discussed between the member Parties in order to ensure a seamless transition onto 
the second commitment period.  
The following unresolved issues took priority at the Doha negotiations and subsequent 
adoption of the second commitment period: the length of the second commitment period, 
mitigation and ambition; the legal continuity from 1 January 2013; the operational continuity 
from 1 January 2013; and the carryover and surplus of tradable units.  
During the negotiations the following countries took centre stage: Algeria speaking on behalf 
of the G77 and China
112
; Nauru speaking for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
113
; 
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Swaziland speaking for the Africa Group
114
; China speaking on behalf of Brazil, India, South 
Africa and China (BASIC)
115
; the European Union
116
; Australia speaking on behalf of the 
Umbrella Group (Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and 
Australia)
117
; Lichtenstein speaking on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group (Mexico, 
Monaco, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Lichtenstein)
118
; and a few others had similar 
yet contrasting views regarding the length of the second commitment period.  
Many developed countries, such as the EU, the Umbrella Group and the Environmental 
Integrity Group were in favour of an 8-year long commitment period, whereas developing 
countries, such as AOSIS and the African Group were in favour of a 5-year long commitment 
period. The rationale behind both sets of years was ambition. In other words, Parties required 
that the new commitment period be ambitious enough. The dilemma which arose at the 
negotiations was attributed mainly to the fact that according to developing countries, a shorter 
commitment period would result in a higher level of ambition, in other words stricter, higher 
targets. On the other hand, the fear of a longer commitment period was evident as developing 
countries stressed the fact that should the targets be low and unambitious, then Parties would 
be confined to such low targets for an 8-year period. Most developed countries stressed the 
fact that the level ambition could be increased unilaterally or collectively by the Parties.   
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the negotiations, it was agreed that the length of the second 
commitment period would last eight years. Consequently, it would commence on 1 January 
2013 and end on 31 December 2020. One of the major concerns between member Parties was 
that a five year period would be suitable as it would create a high level of ambition regarding 
emission reduction targets. In addition, most developing countries which currently do not 
have any legally binding obligations in terms of the second commitment period nor have any 
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emission reduction targets, expressed the fact that a higher level of ambition was required 
from developed countries.  
If one takes into account what the developing world expects from developed member Parties, 
it becomes evident that this would be in line with the principle of CBDR’s and that developed 
countries have to take the lead in addressing climate change.  
In addition, all the Parties which took part at the Doha negotiations agreed that a second 
commitment period starting on 1 January 2013 was to take place without any gap being 
visible from its predecessor. In other words, it became rather evident that no matter how long 
the second commitment period would last, the possibility of a gap existing between both 
commitment periods was not an option for discussion. It became evident that one of the ways 
in which the second commitment period would become operational was once ratification of at 
least 144 member Parties took place. However, since this would in almost all probability take 
years before the necessary number of parties actually ratify the amendment, and also since 
the Protocol did not provide for provisional application left only one option, that being 
provisional application as agreed between the Parties. 
The EU was indeed certain that they would implement the amendment immediately 
disregarding the ratification process. This clearly showed a high level of commitment from 
them and it is hoped that a high level of ambition also plays a large role in the EU in their 
quest to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
The issue of provisional application was crucial during the negotiations. However, before 
further analysis is given, of paramount importance would be to firstly define the concept of 
provisional
119
 application. Provisional application in terms of the amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol means that the amendment to the Protocol is provisionally applied pending its entry 
into force. It must not be neglected that depending on the treaty, protocol or amendment to 
the protocol to enter into force a sufficient number of Parties must ratify such legal 
instrument, a process which in reality takes years before it is completed and brings the 
instrument into force. Provisional application is, therefore, an alternative to bring the legal 
instrument into force at an early stage. In terms of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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Treaties, it provides for provisional application of a treaty in its Article 25
120
, which states 
that a treaty is applied provisionally when it is provided for in the treaty or if the Parties agree 
to it. 
Provisional application has been applied in other instances, for example in commodity 





of the second commitment period does not necessarily 
operate the same way for all countries.  
The final decision adopted by the CMP stated that ‘each Party may provisionally apply from 
1 January 2013 the amendments to the Kyoto Protocol pending entry into force for such Party 
in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol. Also that notification of such 
provisional application be given to the Depositary. Further, Parties that do not provisionally 
apply the amendment will implement their commitments and other responsibilities in 
connection with the second commitment period in a manner that is consistent with their 
national legislation or domestic processes, as of January 2013 and pending the entry into 
force of the amendment in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol.’
123
 This 
clearly showed that provisional application would become operational immediately for the 
EU member Parties and would have the same immediate application effect on other Parties as 
long as such provisional application did not contravene with their national legislation or 
domestic processes. In other words, should the amendment conflict with a Party’s domestic 
laws, this would mean that provisional application would not be possible as a country’s 
national laws prevail over international laws.  
‘Regarding “operational continuity” it was clarified that all Annex I Parties could continue to 
participate in CDM activities, but only Annex I Parties with second commitment period 
emission reduction targets can transfer and acquire certified emission reductions (CER’s) in 
the second commitment period.’
124
 This meant that projects and activities deriving from the 
flexibility mechanisms would not cease at the conclusion of the first commitment period, but 
                                                          
120
 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Legal considerations relating to a possible 
gap between the first and subsequent commitment periods.  Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awg13/eng/10.pdf. 2010. Accessed on: 13 January 2014. At 6.  
121
 Ibid at 7.  
122
 Ibid at 6.  
123
 Ibid.  
124
 AWG-KP Update. Available at: http://unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/items/7446txt.php. Accessed 
on: 10 December 2013.  
that they would continue. However, it was made clear that this would only apply to Parties 
who had taken on emission reduction targets for the second commitment period.  
The last issue in contention was the carryover of AAU’s. This particular issue gave rise to 
much debate due to the fact that member Parties were concerned regarding possible abuse of 
the trading of such units. As analysed above, the possibility of abuse was prone to take place 
and the second commitment period had to ensure that such loophole be closed and rectified. 
To this issue, most Parties agreed that limitations had to be put in place regarding the trading 
of such units. If limits are imposed (coupled with the 90% commitment period reserve 
requirement), then this would certainly avoid the possibility of future abuse of the system.  
‘It was agreed that surplus AAU’s can be carried over without limit from the first to the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol by Parties included in Annex I that have a 
target for the second commitment period, but with restrictions on the use of these carried-
over AAU’s for the second commitment period, and quantitative limits on how many of these 
units may be acquired from other Parties.’
125
 This clearly showed that even though surplus 
AAU’s were allowed to be carried over onto the second commitment period, such allowance 
was coupled with restrictions on the use as well as the amount of carbon units which could be 
purchased from Parties.  
As stated above, the author is of the view that in order to have a seamless transition between 
both commitment periods, all the legal and operational issues had to be firstly discussed and 
secondly agreed upon. The above-mentioned four issues were highly debated at Doha during  
December 2012 and it was finally agreed that the best solution to firstly keep the Kyoto 
Protocol alive and to secondly protect the sanctity of the principle of CBDR’s, was to ensure 
that general agreement be reached on these issues.  
‘In the end, the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Kyoto Protocol mandate (AWG-KP) 
succeeded with parties agreeing that the second commitment period “can” be provisionally 
applied from 1 January 2013. Annex I parties, such as the European countries, preferred a 
longer commitment period due to their internal legislation already in force and due to a desire 
to avoid a gap between the second commitment period and the new regime expected to enter 
into force in 2020.’ 
126
 




 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference (note 94).  
The use of excess AAU’s and whether they could be carried over to the second commitment 
period was one of the most debated issues at Doha. ‘However, these surplus AAU’s are 
mostly “hot air” units that do not represent real mitigation efforts but are due to the economic 
decline experienced during the transition to a market economy by a number of countries, such 
as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Poland.’
127
 
As stated above, three member Parties were not in favour of the amendment limiting the use 
of surplus AAU’s. ‘They stated that “over-achievement” of commitments should not be 
punished by a limitation in the use of AAU’s.’
128
 
As a result, despite the controversial success of such negotiations, a second commitment 
period was agreed and all the above-mentioned legal issues were discussed and agreed upon 
by almost all the member Parties present at the conference. This was crucial in ensuring that a 
seamless transition onto the second commitment period takes place. 
In addition, one legal issue, which should have been, addressed at the Doha negotiations but 
which was not addressed was the lack of financial penalties for non-compliance within the 
Kyoto Protocol. A clear example of this is Canada’s withdrawal from the Protocol while 
faced with non-compliance. Canada took part in the first commitment period between 2008 
and 2012, yet in 2011 it decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and not take any 
further commitments under such international legal regime. During the first commitment 
period, Canada had not been in total compliance with its Kyoto targets, in fact it had an 805 
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide deficit, which would equal to US$19 billion in terms of 
carbon credits. Canada was aware of this and nevertheless opted to withdraw from the 
Protocol in December 2011 by utilizing Article 27
129
 of the Protocol. 
 
Article 27(2) of the Kyoto Protocol states as follows:  
‘Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by 
the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in 
the notification of withdrawal.’
130
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In terms of this Article, it becomes evident that Canada’s withdrawal would only take effect 
one year after its intention to withdraw. This took place during December 2011 and it became 
effective on December 2012. The repercussions of such withdrawal by Canada were as 
follows: ‘Canada’s obligations under the Protocol cover the years 2008-2012 so withdrawal 
would only be meaningful if it were initiated before the end of December 2011, so as to take 
effect before the end of the compliance period.’
131
Therefore, in terms of this Article, a 
country can only be in non-compliance after a review of emissions inventory data takes place. 
This will happen after Canada submits its final inventory report in 2014. 
 
The realistic option for Canada to stay in compliance would have been to either make up for 
the carbon dioxide deficit or to purchase carbon credits in order to equal its legally binding 
emission reduction target of 6% reductions below 1990 levels. However, Canada opted to 
withdraw from the Protocol, due to the fact that there are no financial penalties for non-
compliance under the Protocol. The actual penalty is to hold the country responsible for its 
carbon dioxide deficit, plus 30% in the second commitment period. However, this proved to 
be of no force and effect due to the fact that Canada had withdrawn from the Protocol and 
had no intention of being bound during the second commitment period.  
The author has opted to discuss this legal issue as it clearly represent a major weakness in the 
armour of the Kyoto Protocol which should have been addressed at Doha in 2012, but 
unfortunately it was not discussed, leaving the Protocol vulnerable to the possibility of future 
exploitation.  
4.3 Analysis 
The Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period can be described as a positive step in the 
right direction. As analysed above, there were heated debates which surrounded how a 
second commitment period would be accommodated in a world which is currently divided 
into two spheres. The developed world which is bound by greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets of 18% from 2013 until 2020, and the developing world which continues to be 
protected under the principle of CBDR’s.  
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Many of the legal issues which have had to be dealt with in order to provide for a smooth, 
effective and gapless transition onto the second commitment period were agreed at in Doha in 
December 2012.  In the author’s view, COP 18 was the final opportunity for member Parties 
to agree on the above-mentioned legal issues and to bring the amendments of the Kyoto 
Protocol into force.  
In any event, an interesting analysis would be to consider the current ratification status of 
member Parties as of November 2013. Even though, it has already been agreed that 
provisional application would bring the second commitment period into force immediately 
for most Parties, it would be important to assess the current ratification status of the second 
commitment period, had member Parties not agreed on provisional application.  
As of 27 December 2013, only five member Parties had ratified the amendment. The United 
Arab Emirates ratified the amendment on 26 April 2013; Barbados ratified it on 14 August 
2013; Mauritius ratified it on 15 September 2013; Bangladesh on 13 November 2013; and 
Monaco on 27 December 2013 being the latest ratifying nation.  
If an analysis is provided as to the above-mentioned list of member Parties, it becomes 
evident that the United Arab Emirates and Monaco were the first and last Parties to ratify it 
the amendment, clearly symbolizing the need to have the second commitment period legally 
in force. Secondly, the other three Parties, namely Barbados; Mauritius and Bangladesh are 
all developing countries with two of them being part of the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) which would fall under the category of small island states which are most likely to 
be affected by climate change consequences, such as sea level rise. It must not be forgotten 
that both of these magnificent small island states could severely be affected should the 
melting of the ice caps continue to increase. Although Bangladesh not an island, it will 
significantly be affected by the consequences of climate change.
132
 
In addition, even though at the time of writing
133
, only one Party had ratified the amendment, 
the author opted, for purposes of completeness, to include the most recent developments 
regarding the ratification status of the amendment for the entirety of 2013.  
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From a logical point of view, if provisional application had not been agreed at the Doha 
negotiations, this would have resulted in a complete failure of the Protocol for the following 
reasons: at the time of writing the majority of 2013 has elapsed without any obligations being 
in force for Annex I countries. This is due to the fact that the amendment was adopted subject 
to Articles 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol, and such Articles state that the amendment will 
come into force only after three-fourths of the member Parties have ratified the amendment. 
This meant that 144 nations had to still ratify the amendment before it would come into force.  
As stated above, only five nations have ratified the amendment as of 27 December 2013. 
This would have been one of the biggest obstacles to defeat in the international 
environmental law arena should the Parties not have agreed on provisional application.  
Bearing in mind that neither the Kyoto Protocol nor its amendment make provision for 
provisional application
134
 which would allow an MEA to come into force before the required 
ratification takes place, meant that provisional application as agreed between the Parties was 
the only alternative. The purpose of such provisional enforcement is to avoid a gap between 
the first commitment period and the second commitment period. It has to be acknowledged 
that while this gap was partly avoided by the adoption of the second commitment period 
under rather heated circumstances, the ratification issue was nevertheless something which 
could not be avoided and which inevitably would have led to the unavoidable gap between 
adoption of the amendment and enforcement of it.  
However, according to a Note
135
 by the Secretariat dated 13 September 2013
136
 a number of 
important possible implications for the Compliance Committee during the second 
commitment period were outlined.   
 
Firstly, the timing of the entry into force of the Doha amendment was of crucial importance 
due to the fact that even though Parties had agreed that provisional application of the 
amendment would take place pending ratification of the amendment, such Parties were to 
provide notification of any such provisional application to the Depositary.
137
 However, as of 
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13 September 2013, no declarations had been received by the Depositary. 
138
 This once again 
depicts the complexity of the current climate change regime as a whole. In other words, 
during COP 18, it was agreed that provisional application would take place; however, written 
notification of such intention was never received by the Depositary. As a result, this brings 
the sanctity of the amendment into question as well as the motives of the member Parties. It 
would seem as if provisional application did indeed take place, however, the formality of 
informing the Depositary of their intention to do so was neglected. Nevertheless, it must not 
be forgotten that according to the final decision adopted by the CMP, Parties who do not 
provisionally apply the amendment, but still implement their commitments and 
responsibilities in terms of the second commitment period in a manner which is consistent 
with their national legislation or domestic processes.   
 
Surely, this had created ambiguity regarding the operational continuity of the second 
commitment period. It has already been established that provisional application would enable 
the legal continuity of the amendment; however, when encountered with operational 
continuity it became evident and unfortunate that as of September 2013, the declarations 
which would have made provisional application legal and valid, have not taken place.  
 
The author is of the view that much misused time; disagreement and complexity of legal 
issues have weakened the ambition of the Kyoto Protocol. It would be wise to admit that the 
second commitment period has improved on a number of the shortfalls, which were evident 
in the first commitment period. Yet, the legal operational aspect of the current period might 
be seen as beneficial the moment it becomes evident that the amendments to the Protocol are 
in fact in force. In other words, it is evident that member Parties have agreed and committed 
themselves to provisionally applying the amendments but obscurity of the current status of 
such commitments shows an uncertain and unpromising future in the realm of the climate 
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Negotiating a successor to the Kyoto Protocol has and is currently proving to be an incredibly 
difficult process given the conflicting interests of the negotiating Parties.  
On the one hand, it has become evident that the United States is unlikely to commit to legally 
binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, unless other major greenhouse gas 
emitters are subjected to emission reduction targets as well. Such countries are in fact 
developing countries, more specifically China and India. In other words, in order for 
negotiations on a legal instrument which is set to perhaps replace the Kyoto Protocol entirely, 
will depend on obtaining the cooperation of the United States. This is largely due to the fact 
that they contribute to approximately 19% of greenhouse gas emissions, and also they are one 
of the strongest economies in the world, meaning that they possess the required resources to 
effectively reduce greenhouse gases.  
As it has been emphasised above, in order to successfully combat global climate change, 
whether it be through the Kyoto Protocol or a future successor, will largely depend on the 
stringency of the legal regime which applies to it and also on the compliance of obligations 
from the member Parties. 
Furthermore, in order to create an international agreement which firstly addresses the issue of 
climate change at its root and secondly which ensures that compliance from member Parties 
becomes a reality, will depend on the following factors: 
According to Bodansky
139
 stringency, participation and effectiveness are at the centre of any 
international agreement. What is meant in this instance, is that an MEA must be stringent 
enough so as to lead to overall effectiveness, but at the same time promote participation by 
member Parties. In other words, we cannot have an MEA which is too strict
140
 as this would 
result in a lack of participation from Parties. There must always be a balance between all 
three elements.  
 
For instance, if one analyses the Kyoto Protocol and its first commitment period, it would 
seem clear that the emission reduction targets imposed were not stringent enough so as to 
adequately combat global climate change. In fact, they have been criticised as being 
inadequate and rather weak. Nevertheless, what caused the Protocol to have a lack of 
participation from the United States? And what factor has caused the withdrawal from the 
second commitment period of Canada, Japan, Russia and New Zealand? The answer to both 
these questions can be found within the UNFCCC. This framework Convention stipulated 
that the principle of CBDR had to be applied so as to provide for equity and fairness between 
developed (Annex I) and developing (Non-Annex I) countries. Therefore, it can be stated that 
lack of political will was the main cause of lack of participation, especially from the United 
States. The author has chosen the United States as an example to illustrate this due to the fact 
that they have in the past been the driving force in the implementation of MEA’s, especially 
regarding the financing of such legal agreements. In July 2013, President Obama
141
 stated in 
an interview held at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa that ‘the United States was 
willing to cooperate and therefore participate in the fight against climate change. However, 
they were not prepared to do it alone. Participation from other nations was also required.’
142
 
Here, the correlation between President Obama’s statement and the current climate change 
status referred to no other than China.  
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The reality of the current climate change status is that China and India are unlikely to agree to 
legally binding targets that cap their global emissions. This is due to the fact that this could 
impede their economies from developing further, reason why the principle of CBDR’s was 
created. However, as it has been established in this thesis, perhaps the most adequate way to 
address climate change in an effective manner, is to obtain cooperation from the developing 
world as well. Without the cooperation from the top three greenhouse gas emitters in the 
world, namely China, the United States and India, success in terms of a future legally binding 
agreement is merely an unobtainable dream.  
For instance, the failure of COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen to reach any binding agreement is 
a clear indication of the difficulties of negotiating a successor. Rather than adopting it, the 
COP merely ‘took note’ of the Copenhagen Accord. As it has been stated above, despite the 
immense difference of opinion between member Parties, a new international legally binding 
agreement must be adopted as soon as possible. The urgency in adopting a new legally 
binding agreement can be attributed to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment 
period will come to an end on 31 December 2020 and the hope is that it will not be extended 
further but that it will be replaced by another legal instrument with emission reduction targets 
on both worlds.  
In addition, one of the major reasons why the United States refuses to ‘blink’ and accede to 
an international legally binding agreement with greenhouse gases emission reduction targets, 
is that of China’s potential to further develop its economy. Bearing in mind that China is the 
largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, it is however protected under the principle of 
CBDR’s which protects China from emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Should China continue to grow its economy at such high rate, the United States will surely be 
overtaken as the world’s biggest superpower. This is something which any country would 
want to avoid.  
Nevertheless, despite the ‘staring contest’ between the United States and China, a legal 
solution to global climate change is due. A new international legally binding agreement 
would seem to be the best available option in addressing global climate change.  
However, despite rather political disagreements between the developed and developing 
world, a breakthrough took place in 2011. It was only at COP 17 held in Durban, that 
member Parties agreed that an international legally binding agreement, which is set to impose 
obligations on both the developed as well as the developing world was the way forward. This 
legal instrument seems, in the eyes of many, to be the future of the climate change regime.  
 
According to the commitment undertaken in 2011 at COP 17 in Durban, such an instrument 
is set to be adopted in 2015 at COP 21 to be held in Paris and to be in force by the year 2020, 
which is highly convenient since the Kyoto Protocol second commitment period comes to an 
end on 31 December 2020. The Durban Platform decision provides that the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) is to ‘develop a protocol, another legal instrument, or 
an agreed outcome with legal force under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.’
143
 This clearly shows that change must be brought into the climate change 
arena. It has to be accepted that no real progress has been made ever since the Kyoto Protocol 
came into force, as it did not impose emission reduction targets on developing countries, and 
the emissions which were imposed during the first commitment period were not ambitious 
enough. However, the results of the current second commitment period are still to be seen. 
 
The Protocol’s lack of success does not necessarily mean that the Protocol was a complete 
failure. The Kyoto Protocol whether it survives post-2020 or not, will always be remembered 
as the first MEA which imposed emission reduction targets on member Parties. Even though 
its scope was narrow, and emission targets were rather low, it served as a stepping-stone to 
enable Parties to finally reach an adequate climate change regime. 
 
The only possible solution which would seem to once and for all address climate change 
adequately, is to firstly obtain the cooperation from the United States, and secondly to have 
the developing world bound by emission reduction targets. If this were to take place, the 
principle of CBDR’s would have to be adapted to ensure that while developed countries 
continue to take the lead, developing countries also take on emission reduction targets. 
However, such targets would need to differ from those imposed on developed countries in 
terms of percentage reductions as well as time periods. For instance, bearing in mind that 
developed countries are subjected to 18% emissions reductions from 2013-2020, developing 
countries could be subject to 10% emission reductions until 2022. In other words, lower 
emissions reduction target but for a longer period of time. This hypothetical example depicts 
a manner in which the principle of CBDR’s could be adjusted so as to incorporate the much-
needed contribution of the developing world.  The question which will surely be asked in this 
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particular circumstance is to what extent are developing nations liable for climate change? In 
other words, if both groups of countries are to be imposed with emission reduction targets, 
how will such targets differ between countries? These are questions which can only be 
answered once negotiations take place at COP 21. Whatever the outcome might be, political 
will and adaptation of the principle of CBDR is necessary if all 192 member Parties are to be 
bound by the new climate change regime.  
Ultimately, the final hope would be that the current global reduction of only 15% of all global 
emissions be increased substantially by the cooperation from the biggest emitters of 
greenhouse gases.  
In order to effect any meaningful change, the ADP needs to impose binding commitments on 
developing countries to reduce their emission levels. China and India are both non-Annex I 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol, and are thus not subject to binding emission reduction 
targets. This must change in the new climate change regime. Commitments from the United 
States also need to be obtained, as they would be a key player in the financing of the 
agreement.    
In concluding, global climate change has been described as possibly being one of the most 
important environmental law matters presently taking centre stage in the international 
environmental law arena. Firstly, the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, has been seen 
as the first step in an attempt to combat climate change. Even though it is a framework 
Convention without any actual emission reduction targets, it set the foundation for the future 
establishment of its subsequent Protocol. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was 
adopted and it entered into force in 2005. This Protocol was the only international engine 
which the world at large depended on to address the issue of climate change. The Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period took place between 2008 to 2012, leaving the door open 
to much heated debate regarding the future of the Protocol post-2012. Nevertheless, despite 
much uncertainty, in 2012, the Kyoto Protocol was amended so as to give way to a second 
commitment period which is currently the only international climate change regime in 
existence and even though it is currently being in force by way of provisional application, its 
actual ratification status is rather low.  
As it has been seen from this thesis, the Kyoto Protocol could be described as an ambitious 
MEA. This is due to the fact that while many of its criticisms related to inadequate emission 
reduction targets, lack of participation by the world’s largest greenhouse emitters and most 
importantly by the failure to have the shortcomings of the first commitment period rectified 
in the second commitment period, it nevertheless succeeded in being extended until 31 
December 2020. In addition, it must be acknowledged that while the second commitment 
period will not play a decisive role in curbing global climate change, it is the only 
international agreement that the world at large depends on to address climate change until 
2020. In other words, between 2013 and 2020, no other legal regime at an international level 
is available. The Convention and its Protocol, whether they are replaced or not, will always 
be remembered as the MEA’s which first gathered the world’s nations in the hope to address 
global climate change.  
With regards to the future of a climate change regime, it can be stated that success in the 
international environmental law arena, will only be obtained the moment the environment 
becomes the top priority in states’ agendas and not their economies. In other words, while 
any action taken by states means that billions of dollars are to be spent in addressing a 
problem which we only have ourselves to blame for, the environment as well the ensured 
existence of future generations should always prevail over politics, economics and the never-
ending fight for worldwide economic dominance. 
It has to be admitted that while greenhouse gases are part of our existence, their complete 
elimination is virtually impossible. This has to be accepted and states must work around such 
fact. What has to be agreed upon, hopefully by the adoption and subsequent ratification of the 
ADP, is a global commitment by both developed and developing countries with emission 
reduction targets being imposed on both. The adaptation and perhaps slight departure from 
the UNFCCC principle of CBDR is something which might have to be sacrificed in order to 
obtain the full cooperation from the United States. While they are not the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, their financial cooperation and weight in decision-making could prove to 
be the difference between success and failure. If the developing world, continues with their 
unrestricted greenhouse gas emissions, it is indeed correct to assume that sooner rather than 
later they will become developed countries with economies flourishing. Nevertheless, success 
always comes at a high price, and the price to pay shall not be in a known currency nor in a 
quantified amount, its price would be the deprivation of future generations from knowing the 
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